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Abstract. Usually object types are organized in taxonomies by means
of a specialization relation (also called subtyping or isa) ‘implemented’
by means of inheritance. This paper proposes a (non-incompatible) alter-
native to taxonomies that relies on three primitives: grounding, a specific
kind of factual existential dependence, extensional atemporal parthood,
and existence at a time. On the basis of these relations, specific, generic,
and compositional grounding relations between object types are intro-
duced. By clearly separating the objects from the substrata on which
they are grounded, these grounding relations allow to stratify object
types in levels and to manage inheritance in a flexible way. In particular,
this approach helps to avoid isa overloading and to overcome some classi-
cal difficulties related to inheritance, e.g. attribute overriding, attribute
hiding, or dynamic and multiple classification and specialization, that
are relevant aspects especially in modeling roles.
Keywords: Grounding, Dependence, Levels, Taxonomies, Inheritance
Classification schemes – taxonomies based on subtyping (isa) among object
types – and inheritance are central notions in conceptual modeling (CM) and
in object-oriented modeling. By assuming, for instance, that Statue is a subtype
of Amount Of Matter1, Statue inherits all the attributes and associations2 of
Amount Of Matter. However, new attributes can be introduced. For instance,
Statue, but not Amount Of Matter, could have the attribute Style. Similarly
roles3 like Student, Customer, or President could be modeled as subtypes of
Person. Student, but not Person, has a Matriculation. Customer, but not Per-
son, has a Code, etc. This powerful mechanism of inheritance faces some well
known problems. Statue and Amount Of Matter could have different values for
the ‘same’ attribute, e.g. Price: a statue could be more expensive than a brute
piece of bronze. Customer, differently from Person, could not have Weight or
Place Of Birth. Attribute overriding and hiding try to manage these problems.
Furthermore, roles can be played by objects with ‘incompatible’ attributes. For
instance, both companies and persons can be customers, but Customer is neither
1 Amounts of matter are concrete entities, pieces of matter, specific sums of molecules,
e.g. the piece of gold that now constitutes my ring, not ‘the gold’ or ‘gold’.
2 In this paper I will focus only on data modeling and not on behavior modeling.
3 The term role indicates here a specific kind of object types (properties). Roles in-
tended as ‘parts in relationships’ are close to relational roles (see [12]).
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a subtype nor a supertype of both Company and Person. “[W]e have the para-
doxical situation that, from the extensional point of view, roles are supertypes
statically, while dynamically they are subtypes” ([17], p.90). While keeping the
same domain, this problem can be managed by adding new objects types, e.g.
Private Customer (subtype of both Person and Customer) and Corporate Cus-
tomer (subtype of both Company and Customer) [7], or by introducing dynamic
and multiple classification and specialization (see [17] for a review). Alterna-
tively, more permissive or multiplicative approaches extend the domain with
new entities. Steimann [17] separates natural types (e.g. Person) from role types
(e.g. Customer). Roles are adjunct instances linked by a played-by relation to
their players (the persons or companies in the case of customers). The object and
its roles form an aggregate and “the dynamic picking up of a role corresponds
to the creation of a new instance of the corresponding role type and its integra-
tion in a compound, and dropping a role means releasing the role instance from
the unit and destroy it” ([17], p.91). In object-oriented database management
systems, by distinguishing specialization, an abstract concept, from inheritance,
a mechanism that implements specialization, [1] systematically multiplies the
instances in the presence of a subtype relation. If P is a subtype of Q, then the
creation of an object p of type P produces the creation of an object q of type Q
plus a link between them that allows p to inherit attributes from q. An object
then is implemented “by multiple instances which represent its many faceted
nature. Those instances are linked together through aggregation links in a spe-
cialization relation” ([1], p.561). The attributes are locally defined and stored
but additional ones can be inherited via the links between the instances. From a
more foundational perspective, multiplicative approaches have been investigated
to solve the counting problem [9]. For instance, to count the Alitalia passengers
(during 2010), one cannot just count the persons that flew Alitalia (during 2010).
By adding qua-entities [12], (sum of) relational tropes [7], or role-holders [13]
– entities that inhere in (a sort of existential specific dependence), but are dif-
ferent from, the players (see Section 1 for more details) – the counting problem
is solved. In philosophy, multiplicativism is often considered also in the case of
statues, organisms, tables, etc. (see [14] for a review and [3] for a recent defense).
Interestingly, qua-entities have been originally introduced in this contest [6]. As
in the case of roles, statues and amounts of matter have different properties (in
particular causal properties) and different persistence conditions. The amount
of matter that constitutes a specific statue can change through time. Or, an
amount of matter can constitute some statue only during a part of its life, when
it is statue-shaped. Therefore, some authors assume that statues are constituted
by (a sort of existential dependence), but different from, amounts of matter.
Taxonomies are undeniably an important conceptual tool to organize object
types according to the set-theoretical inclusion between their extensions. But it
is not the only one. This paper proposes a complementary structuring mecha-
nism founded on a specific kind of existential dependence called grounding. This
mechanism allows to account for both roles and material objects with a flexible
management of inheritance that helps to avoid isa overloading and misuse.
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1 Statues, customers, presidents, and tables
Let us assume that statues can change their material support through time while
maintaining their shape, i.e. the shape, not the material support, is essential for
statues. It follows that Statue is not a subtype of Amount Of Matter. One
can represent ‘being a statue’ as a binary predicate with a temporal argument,
Statuetx stands for “at the time t, the amount of matter x is a statue (is statue-
shaped)” (d1)4. According to (d1), ‘being a statue’ becomes a sort of (relational)
role played by amounts of matter. Counting seems unproblematic: the statues
present at t are the amounts of matter that are statue-shaped at t. However,
problems arise by considering a non atomic time, e.g. the whole 2010. A statue
could change its material support during 2010, i.e. we could have two amounts
of matter that are statue-shaped during 2010 but only one single statue. On
the other side, if the same amount of matter, at a given time, is the support
of two different statues, then we have one amount of matter but two statues.
This sounds wrong because one usually excludes co-location of statues. Different
are the cases of artifacts intended as (material) objects with an assigned (by
the creator) functionality [4], and roles where, for example, at a given time the
same person can be the customer of different companies or a multiple-customer
of the the same company (see [12] for more details). The strategy to multiply
predicates, e.g. one specialization of Statue for each statue, incurs in the problem
of expressing what is the exact property that identifies the amounts of matter
that, for instance, ‘are’ David at different times.
d1 Statuetx , AmountOfMatterx ∧ xHasShapety ∧ StatueShapey
A multiplicative approach helps in managing these problems. In the litera-
ture, the nature and the relations among different kinds of entities are discussed.
Four-dimensionalism (see [15]) accepts spatio-temporal-worms. A statue, say
david, and the amount of matter m that constitutes david only during a part of
its life, are two overlapping but different worms: some temporal slices of david
are not part of m. Problems can arise when david and m coincide (share the
same slices) during their whole lives. Some approaches refuse spatio-temporal
coincidence. Other approaches support a modal distinction founded on slices
spreading across possible worlds: david and m are different world-spatio-temporal
worms because david can exist without coinciding with m (and vice versa).
In a three dimensionalist perspective, multiplicative positions (see [18]) as-
sume that statues (generically) existentially depend on, more precisely they are
consituted by, amounts of matter without overlapping with them. In particular,
Fine [6] analyzes constitution on the basis of the notion of qua-entity. If an object
a, the basis, instantiates a property P , the gloss, then there exists an additional
entity, a-qua-P that is a sort of amalgam of a and P .5 The entity a-qua-P , e.g.
m-qua-s-shaped (m-qua-having-shape-s) exists at every time at which a instanti-
ates P , it is uniquely determined by a and P , and it can inherit (not necessarily
4 To avoid reference to shapes one can consider StatueShapedtx where x is an object.
5 Qua-entities seem similar to states of affairs as defined in [2].
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all) the properties of a. Therefore, by assuming that at a given time t an amount
of matter m can have only an unique shape, say s, then only a single m-qua-
s-shaped entity exists at t. On the other hand, a s-shaped amount of matter
m′ 6= m generates, say at t′, a necessarily different qua-entity m′-qua-s-shaped.
If m and m′ constitute, respectively at t and t′, one single statue, then still we
have two qua-entities and just one statue. According to [6], statues are mereo-
logical sums of qua-entities (m-qua-s-shaped + m′-qua-s-shaped) aggregated by
(spatio-temporal) unity criteria.6
Because of their relational nature, roles (and artifacts) are more controver-
sial than material objects. While, at a given time t, amounts of matter have
an unique shape, the same person, e.g. john, can be simultaneously a customer
of different companies, e.g. alitalia and airfrance, i.e. both john-qua-customer-of-
alitalia and john-qua-customer-of-airfrance can exist at t.7 Moreover, differently
from statues, customers always depend on the same person. This implies that
different customers can share the same support, the same player.8 Second, ‘the
president of Italy’ and ‘the president of Alitalia’, are ‘constituted-by’ different
persons through time and they can also share the same support at some time
(somebody can be both the president of Italy and the president of Fiat). There-
fore, in the case of roles, both the nature of the glosses9 and the unity criteria
are quite heterogeneous. Customers have always the same support (player) be-
cause they are discriminated on the basis of the glosses, e.g. ‘being a customer
of Alitalia’ vs. ‘being a customer of Airfrance’ (see saturated roles in [12]) while
presidents require unity criteria based on laws or social rules because spatio-
temporal considerations are no relevant.10
The same abstract mechanism works also for structured objects. For instance,
one can think that (a specific kind of) tables necessarily have four legs and one
top even though it is possible to substitute them during their life. In this case
tables can be aggregates of qua-entities where the basis is a complex object, e.g.
6 Differently from classical temporal slices (see the definition in [15]), qua-entities
persist through time when the basis instantiates the gloss during a whole interval.
7 Here ‘customer-of’ is a relation defined on persons and companies. Qua-entities are
then identified by a person and a property like ‘being a customer of company A’.
DBs often add customer codes that, however, in general, are keys to identify persons
not customers. This is due to the fact that DBs do not refer to persons, they just
manage cluster of attributes (e.g. Name, Date Of Birth, etc.) that do not always
identify persons. Customer codes could be conceptually necessary when the same
person can have different customer roles inside the same company according to, for
instance, his/her rights or obligations. In this case, the way qua-entities are identified
is different because there is a third argument in ‘customer-of’.
8 In this view customers coincide with single qua-entities, a limit case of mereological
sum, that have the ‘form’ person-qua-customer-of-A. This explains why multiplica-
tivist models of roles often consider only qua-entities and not general sums.
9 Some authors claim that roles are necessary based on anti-rigid properties. I will
not address here this topic.
10 It is not clear to me whether unity criteria that involve diachronic constraints are
part of the glosses.
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a sum of four legs and one top, and the gloss is a structural property reducible
to some spatial relations holding between the legs and the top. In this case
there are two unity criteria. A synchronic one that establishes how the legs and
the top must be structured, and a diachronic one that establishes the allowed
substitutions of legs and tops through time.
Despite the differences previously discussed, I think that a unified view on
(structured and unstructured) material objects and roles is possible. At the end,
all these kinds of objects have an intensional dimension, to be identified, they
rely on intensional rules.
2 Founding modeling primitives on a theory of levels
I consider a temporally qualified and factual primitive called grounding : x≺t y
stands for “x grounds y at t”. Following Husserl and Fine, Correia [5] bases his
theory of dependence on grounding, informally interpreted as “at t, the existence
of x makes possible the one of y” or “y owes its existence at t to x”. Grounding
is factual because the usual definition of the specific existential dependence of x
on y, i.e. (Ex → Ey) (where Ex stands for “x exists”)11, reduces dependence
to “the necessary truth of a material conditional whose antecedent is about x
only and whose consequent is about y only; and given that any such material
conditional fails to express any ‘real’ relation between the two objects, it is
hard to see how prefixing it with a necessary operator could change anything in
this connection” ([5], p.58). Grounding is temporally qualified because the usual
definition of the generic existential dependence of an object on an type P , i.e.
(Ex → ∃y(Ey ∧ Py)), does not allow to represent on which object an object
depends at a given time.
Even though I completely agree on these remarks, I consider here a notion of
grounding that is stricter than the one of Correia, a notion somewhere in between
pure existential dependence and constitution. Let us come back to qua-entities.
Fine considers a-qua-P as an amalgam of a and P . From a purely existential
perspective, a-qua-P depends on both a and P . If P is a relational property,
e.g. ‘being the customer of alitalia’, then john-qua-customer-of-alitalia existen-
tially depends not only on john but also on alitalia. Intuitively, my grounding
aims at capturing the specific existential dependence between john and john-qua-
customer-of-alitalia by excluding the one between alitalia and john-qua-customer-
of-alitalia. To add intuitions. Let us suppose that ‘supplier-for’ is the inverse of
‘customer-of’, i.e. john is a customer of alitalia if and only if alitalia is a supplier
for john. Ontologically, there are reasons to identify ‘customer-of’ and ‘supplier-
for’. However also in this case, john-qua-customer-of-alitalia is intuitively different
from alitalia-qua-supplier-for-john because we are changing the ‘perspective’, we
are changing the basis (and therefore the gloss). In particular, even though the
first qua-entity existentially depends on alitalia, it is strictly linked to (directed to
and thicker than) john. Approaches based on constitution, often advocate spa-
tial co-location. The constituted entity is co-located with the constituent entity.
11 This definition has been modified to answer some criticisms. See [16] and [5].
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In the case of qua-entities, john-qua-customer-of-alitalia is intuitively co-located
with john not with alitalia. However, my grounding is defined on objects that are
not necessarily in space. In addition, constitution (and supervenience [10]) often
excludes relational properties from the ones that can ‘generate’ new (kinds of)
entities. Aiming at managing roles, this constraints is too strong for my goal.
Formally, I simplify the theory in [11] by avoiding the temporal qualification
of parthood and by discarding the primitive of being at the same level as.
Grounding is asymmetric, transitive, down linear (a1), and implies existence
(a2), where the primitve Etx stands for “the object x exists, is present, at time
t”, or, more neutrally, “x is temporally extended through the time t”.12 Direct
grounding (d2) captures one single grounding step.
Parthood, xPy stands for “x is part of y”, is a a purely formal notion on the
basis of which overlap (O) is defined as usual [16]. More precisely, I consider a
classical extensional mereology : parthood is reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive,
implies existence, and satisfies the strong supplementation principle (a3) guar-
anteeing that two objects with the same parts are identical [16]. Mereological
sums, sSM{a1, . . . , an} stands for “s is the mereological sum of a1, . . . , an” (d3),
refer to ‘multitudes’ of objects without a strong ontological commitment. For
instance, four legs and one top exist if and only if their mereological sum exists,
but if they are disassembled no table exists.13 Grounding is not a specific kind
of parthood. Differently from (improper) parthood, grounding is irreflexive (di-
rectly from asymmetry). Differently from proper parthood, grounding does not
satisfy the strong (and the weak) supplementation principle. For example, the
fact that an amount of matter m grounds a statue does not require the statue
to be grounded on additional entities disjoint from m, i.e. m could be the only
grounding of the statue. More strongly, I assume that grounding and parthood
are incompatible: x≺t y → ¬xPy. Note however that a grounding object is not
necessarily atomic, i.e. it can have proper parts.
a1 y≺t x ∧ z≺t x→ y≺t z ∨ y = z ∨ z≺t y (down linearity)
a2 x≺t y → Etx ∧ Ety
a3 ¬xPy → ∃z(zPx ∧ ¬zOy) (strong supplementation)
a4 x≺t y → (Tx↔ ¬Ty) (T is a leaf type)
a5 T1x ∧ T2y ∧ x≺t y → ¬∃zut′(T1z ∧ T2u ∧ u≺t′ z) (T1, T2 leaf types)
d2 x<ty , x≺t y ∧ ¬∃z(x≺t z ∧ z≺t y) (direct grounding)
d3 sSM{a1, . . . , an} , ∀z(zPs↔ (zPa1 ∨ ... ∨ zPan)) (mereological sum)
Levels are partially captured by (a finite set of) types that are assumed to be
non-empty and rigid properties formally represented by (non temporally quali-
fied) unary predicates Ti. Types can be extensionally organized in a taxonomy.
Leaf types, types with no subtypes, partition the domain. According to (a4),
grounding always relies on a difference in type that is expressible in the theory,
12 I will focus here only on objects present at some time.
13 Sums need to be carefully managed because not all the summands necessarily exist
at every time at which the sum exists.
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i.e. grounding does not hold between objects belonging to the same leaf type.
Together with (a5), it avoids grounding loops. (a4) and (a5) are basic require-
ment for structuring (leaf) types in levels that assure also the maximality (with
respect to parthood) of the grounds.14
After all these technical details, I will now introduce three grounding rela-
tions useful to organize types in levels. The formal definitions characterize the
semantic of these grounding relations, but, once understood, they can be used as
conceptual modeling primitives. In this sense, according to the following quote,
they can be seen as an abstraction, simplification, and hiding of the previous
analysis: “The theoretical notions which are required for suitable characteriza-
tions of domain conceptualizations are of a complex nature. This puts emphasis
on the need for appropriate computational support for hiding as much as possible
this inherent complexity from conceptual modeling practitioners.” ([8], p.9).
T1 is (directly) specifically grounded on T2 (a6), noted T1 B T2, if every T1-
object is (directly) grounded on a single T2-object during its whole life, e.g.
Customer B Person. It is often motivated by emergent properties. Customer is
no more modeled as a subtype of Person. Customer is now a rigid type, i.e. a
customer is necessarily a customer, with specific attributes. I think this is a quite
simplifying CM technique. Furthermore, the temporal extension of a customer
is included in the one of the person (a different object) that grounds him, i.e.,
to exist, a customer requires a grounding person while persons do not require
customers. We will see how (some of) the attributes of Person can be inherited
by Customer and vice versa.
T1 is (directly) generically grounded on T2 (a7), noted T1IT2, if every T1-
object is (directly) grounded on some, but not necessarily the same, T2-object,
e.g. StatueIAmountOfMatter. It is often motivated by different persistence con-
ditions.15 Note that the proposed framework does not commit on a specific on-
tological theory of persistence. One can quantify on both statues and amounts
of matter without including in the domain temporal slices, qua-entities, states
of affairs, events, or tropes. Indeed without being forced to, the modeler can,
through axioms that links statues and amounts of matter, make explicit the
underlying theory of persistence (in addition to the unity criteria).
T is (directly and generically) compositionally grounded on T1, . . . , Tm if every
T-object is (directly) grounded on some, but not necessarily the same, mereologi-
cal sum of T1-,. . . ,Tm-objects. It is often motivated by structural relations among
T1-,. . . ,Tm-objects. I distinguish definite compositional grounding (a8)
16, noted
14 In general, levels are not necessarily linear and they can be conceived as collections
of objects that obey the same laws of nature, have common identity criteria or
persistence conditions. These are interesting points for CM that deserve future work.
15 Customer are not completely determined by persons, nor statues by amounts of mat-
ters. Grounding does not necessarily imply reduction, it differs from determination
used to explain supervenience, e.g. “The mental is dependent on the physical, or the
physical determines the mental, roughly in the sense that the mental nature of a
thing is entirely fixed by its physical nature” ([10], p.11).
16 In (a8) and (a9) ¬Ti(x+y) is a shortcut for ∃s(sSM{x, y}∧¬Tis)∨¬∃s(sSM{x, y}).
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TI〈(n1)T1; . . . ; (nm)Tm〉, e.g. TableI〈Surface; (4)Leg〉17, i.e. when a table exists
it is grounded on exactly one surface and four legs, from (at least) indefinite
compositional grounding (a9), noted T1I(>n)T2, e.g. OrganismI(>2)Cell, i.e.
organisms are grounded on at least two cells even though the exact number of
grounding cells can vary in time.18 To count the grounding objects one must rely
on clear principles that identify unitary objects. For example, I would exclude
StatueI(>2)AmountOfMatter and StatueI(2)AmountOfMatter. Here I just as-
sume a mereological principle, i.e. the grounding Ti-objects does not overlap and
their sums are not of type Ti (see (a8) and (a9)).
19
a6 T1x→ ∃y(T2y ∧ ∀t(Etx→ y<tx)) (specific direct grounding)
a7 T1x→ ∀t(Etx→ ∃y(T2y ∧ y<tx)) (generic direct grounding)
a8 Tx→ ∀t(Etx→ ∃y11 ... y1n1 ... ym1 ... ymnms
Ety11 ∧ ... ∧ Etymnm ∧ sSM{y11,..., ymnm} ∧ s<tx ∧
T1y11 ∧ ...∧ T1y1n1 ∧¬y11Oy12 ∧ ...∧¬y1,n1−1Oy1n1 ∧¬T1(y11 + y12)∧ ...
...
Tmym1 ∧ ... ∧ Tmymnm ∧ ¬ym1Oym2 ∧ ... ∧ ¬Tm(ym1 + ym2) ∧ ...
a9 T1x→ ∀t(Etx→ ∃s(s<tx ∧ ∀z(zPs→ ∃u(uPz ∧ T2u)) ∧
∃y1 ... yn(Ety1 ∧ ... ∧ Etyn ∧ y1Ps ∧ ... ∧ ynPs ∧ T2y1 ∧ ... ∧ T2yn ∧
¬y1Oy2 ∧ ... ∧ ¬yn−1Oyn ∧ ¬T2(y1 + y2) ∧ ¬T2(y1 + y3) ∧ ...)))
Generic (or specific) grounding relations can be easily combined. For ex-
ample, KitchenI〈Table; Oven; (>2)Chair〉. To mix specific and generic (com-
positional) grounding, one just needs to introduce more elaborate definitions.
E.g., CarBI〈BChassis;IEngine;I(4)Wheel;I(> 1)WindscreenWiper〉 (BI is
heterogeneous grounding) stands for “cars specifically depend on a chassis and
generically depend on an engine, four wheels, and at least one windscreen wiper”.
Methodologically, one can start from the fundamental types, types that are
not grounded20, and then, according to the grounding relations, progressively
arrange the other (leaf) types in layers. Figure 1 depicts a simple example (with
only a fundamental type, namely AmountOfMatter) that shows the weakness of
the notion of level: types can be grounded on types that have a different distance
from the fundamental level as in the case of Exhibition.
Inheritance. All the types involved in grounding relations are rigid and disjoint
from the ones on which they are grounded. Customers, statues, and tables are
17 I write TableI〈Surface; (4)Leg〉 instead of TableI〈(1)Surface; (4)Leg〉. This is con-
sistent with the fact that T1IT2 is equivalent to T1I〈(1)T2〉, i.e. generic compositional
grounding is an extension of generic grounding.
18 ‘At most’ indefinite compositional grounding, cardinality constraints (for exam-
ple, FootballTeamI(11...22)FootballPlayer). Moreover, indefinite compositional
grounding can also be used to introduce levels of granularity, even though addi-
tional constraints are necessary (see [11] for a preliminary discussion).
19 Specific compositional grounding can be defined starting from the corresponding
generic case by considering the ‘form’ in (a6) instead of the one in (a7).
20 The existence of a (unique) fundamental level is debated in philosophy. However, in
applicative terms, I don’t see any drawback in accepting fundamental types.
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Exhibition
I(>1)
B(>1)
Table
I(4) I
Statue
I
Leg
I
Surface
I
AmountOfMatter
Fig. 1. Structuring object types according to grounding relations.
such during their whole life. Grounding and subtyping are separate relations,
therefore the problems due to isa overloading trivially disappear. As drawback,
we loose the power of the inheritance mechanism. However, Baker [3] observes
that constitution (a specific grounding) provides a unity, it allows the constituted
entity to inherit (to derivatively have) some properties from the constituting one
and vice versa.21 E.g. amounts of matter (persons) can inherit the style (right
to vote for student representatives) from the statues (students) they ground.
On the basis of these observations, following [1], the inheritance of attributes
of grounded types must be controlled. By default, T1 B T2 or T1IT2 implies
that all the attributes of T2 are inherited by T1. T1[A
1
1, ...,A
1
n] B T2[A21, ...,A2m]
means that only the T2 attributes A
2
1, ...,A
2
m are exported to T1 while the T1 at-
tributes A11, ...,A
1
n are exported to T2. Similarly in the case of generic grounding.
Statue[Style]IAmountOfMatter means that Statue inherits all the attributes
of AmountOfMatter, while the last type inherits only the attribute Style from
Statue. In this way, attribute hiding can be trivially modeled. Attribute overrid-
ing can be approached by systematically override the attributes of the grounding
type or by localizing all the attributes as in [1]. The case of compositional de-
pendence is interesting. Some attributes of the grounded object can be obtained
from a ‘composition’ of the attributes of the grounds. For example, the weight of
tables is the sum of the weights of the grounding legs and surfaces. If necessary
these rules can be explicitly added as constraints. Alternatively, one can add
dependences among the values of attributes.
Grounding and subtyping. It is trivial to prove that if T1⇒T222 and T2 B T3
then T1 B T3. Vice versa, from T1 ⇒ T2 and T1 B T3, T2 B T3 does not follow.
Moreover, from T1 B T2 and T2⇒ T3 it follows that T1 B T3 but one looses the
information about the specific subtype on which T1 is grounded. A ‘parsimonious
approach’ considers only maximally informative grounding relations T1 B T2: T1
is maximal with respect to subtyping, while T2 is minimal. This criterion (to-
gether with the fact that only direct grounding relations are considered) allows to
clarify the nature of abstract types like MaterialObject. Let us assume Leg⇒
MaterialObject, Surface⇒ MaterialObject, and Table⇒ MaterialObject
21 However, high-level properties are not always reducible to properties of substrata.
22 ⇒ represents the subtyping relation. The following results hold also for generic de-
pendence. Here I do not consider the composition of grounding relations.
10 Claudio Masolo
and compare the model that considers all the grounding relations in Figure 1
with the one with only MaterialObjectIAmountOfMatter. Given the same tax-
onomical information, only the first model makes explicit that MaterialObject
is an abstract and multi-level type.
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